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Setting the right framework 
for modern ﬁ  nancial markets
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HUGO BANZIGER
Chief Risk Ofﬁ  cer and Member of the Management Board
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The current ﬁ  nancial crisis is a watershed event that will require comprehensive action by the ﬁ  nancial 
industry to restore conﬁ  dence in ﬁ  nancial institutions in general and the market for structured credit 
products speciﬁ  cally. The originate-and-distribute model will survive, but will undergo modiﬁ  cation and will 
require banks to upgrade their operations. An improvement in risk management (both in approach and 
process) is the most important area, with additional focus on liquidity management and derivatives markets 
infrastructure. Regarding valuation issues, reform efforts must recognise that this is not “just” an accounting 
issue. Changes must respect the beneﬁ  ts of fair value accounting, but, at the same time, address the issues 
of illiquid markets, procyclicality and consistency between accounting standards.ARTICLES
Hugo Banziger: “Setting the right framework for modern ﬁ  nancial markets – Lessons learned from the recent crisis”
8  Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 12 – Valuation and ﬁ  nancial stability ￿ October 2008
F
or more than a year now, global ﬁ  nancial 
markets have been in the grip of a crisis that 
already ranks amongst watershed events in 
ﬁ  nancial history. Reﬂ  ecting this, the crisis has 
triggered a fundamental and wide-ranging review 
of every part of the ﬁ  nancial system, spanning 
the entire range from supervisory structures and 
ﬁ   nancial regulation to market infrastructures, 
from banks’ risk management processes to their 
business strategies. Indeed, looking at the long lists 
of recommendations which have been produced as 
lessons learned by both the ofﬁ  cial and the private 
sector, it is no exaggeration to claim that no stone 
has been left unturned. Considering the severity 
of losses suffered by many ﬁ  nancial institutions 
and the widespread loss in conﬁ  dence within 
the ﬁ  nancial system, nothing less is warranted. 
Yet, at the same time it will be important not 
to throw out the baby with the bathwater: 
ﬁ  nancial innovations such as securitisation and 
structured credit products must be improved upon,
not eliminated.
THE REAL BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS
The ﬁ  nancial crisis that is plaguing global ﬁ  nancial 
markets has a background in the real economy. The 
importance of this is often seriously underestimated 
in comparison with the causes that lie directly 
within the ﬁ  nancial sector itself and that are usually
held out as being primarily responsible for the crisis. 
In fact, as any major ﬁ  nancial crisis, it is the result of 
the conﬂ  uence of several factors. But there can be no 
doubt that the US real estate market is at the epicentre 
of the crisis and is pivotal for its course: neither can 
the crisis be understood without understanding events 
in the US housing markets, nor can ﬁ  nancial stability 
return without their stabilisation. It must be borne 
in mind that, given the size of the US mortgage debt 
market (USD 13 trillion), even a comparatively small 
change in asset values quickly translates into enormous 
losses in the ﬁ  nancial system (e.g. USD 650 billion 
for a 5% change in asset values). The reality is that 
the United States has been in the worst real estate 
recession ever since the burst of the bubble that had 
led to a doubling of real estate values between 2000 
and 2006. Prices have fallen more than 15% from 
their peak and are likely to fall further. Already, many 
borrowers are not able to service their debt and many 
more will not be able to do so once teaser rates and 
variable interest rates are reset; thus, default rates
will rise further. As a consequence, ﬁ  nancial stability 
will only be restored if and when the crisis in US real 
estate markets is resolved.
It should be pointed out that some of the rise in 
US  building activity and real estate valuations 
was, and still is, fundamentally justiﬁ  ed given the 
favourable demographic development in many 
US states. However, house price developments 
eventually went beyond what was justiﬁ  ed  by 
fundamentals alone. Essentially, what fuelled 
house price developments beyond sustainable 
levels were two factors: ﬁ  rst, the global liquidity 
glut that preceded the crisis and, second, ﬁ  nancial 
innovation.
The liquidity glut in turn was the result of, on 
the one hand, a US monetary policy that was too 
loose and has been mirrored in many emerging 
market countries that peg their national currencies 
to the dollar. On the other hand, many emerging 
markets, especially those in Asia, have a structural 
savings-investment gap, with surplus funds being 
invested in US ﬁ  nancial assets, thereby driving down 
yields in the United States. Abundant liquidity and 
underpriced risk prompted individuals and companies 
to leverage up. This has been particularly visible in 
the drastic increase in household indebtedness in 
many countries, especially the United States. As a 
mirror image on the investor side, the consequence 
of low nominal interest rates in the United States 
–and, spreading from there, worldwide– was a search 
for yield, as investors tried to meet their (nominal) 
performance targets. Low interest rates, in conjunction 
with low inﬂ  ation rates and low market volatility of 
real as well as ﬁ  nancial variables, led to a period 
of unusually benign ﬁ  nancial markets in general 
and historically low default rates in particular. This 
environment dulled risk consciousness and led some 
to take on risk that, in retrospect, was underpriced. It 
also encouraged some investors to indulge in maturity 
transformation and regulatory arbitrage: structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs) issued asset-backed 
commercial papers (ABCPs) to ﬁ  nance investment 
in mortgage-backed securities and structured credit 
products, in effect transforming an abundance of 
cheap short-term liquidity into longer-term credit 
investments. This model depended on a continuation 
of the liquidity glut and a resilient housing market.
The real-estate bubble would not have been as 
pronounced as it was without the ﬁ  nancial innovation ARTICLES
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which made available increased volumes of cheap 
credit to a wider pool of potential property owners. 
This was particularly true for the enormous expansion 
of market segments which hitherto had been 
niche markets –the subprime and Alt-A segments. 
Financial innovation also allowed a general increase 
in the loan volume via securitisations, which were 
then placed with investors worldwide. In principle, 
this spreading of risk is a good thing as it avoids risk 
concentrations in any given national ﬁ  nancial system. 
Indeed, from a US point of view it is undeniably 
favourable that the blow to the US economy from 
the housing recession is being cushioned by the fact 
that some of the pain is borne by foreign investors. 
However, the scale of the US housing bubble led
to the build-up of enormous exposures worldwide 
to the US real estate market, directly and indirectly 
through the securities built on these assets, and to 
serious imbalances in the ﬁ  nancial system. These 
were compounded by deﬁ  ciencies in the origination 
process, the structure of ﬁ  nancial markets and the 
risk management approaches of many investors.
VALUATION ISSUES: FAR MORE 
THAN AN ACCOUNTING ISSUE
While the above-mentioned factors can be regarded 
as the causes of the crisis, other factors aggravated it, 
once the chain of events was set in train. In this 
context, a considerable controversy has broken out 
in the aftermath of the crisis, whether fair value 
(or mark-to-market) accounting can be blamed for 
deepening the crisis. Fundamentally, of course, 
mark-to-market has a procyclical effect by deﬁ  nition. 
Consequently, the controversy should usefully be 
concentrated on the question of whether this effect is 
materially important (especially in a crisis situation) 
and, if so, what can be done about it.
The more extensive use of fair value accounting 
reﬂ   ects, of course, the changing nature of 
banks’ business models, which led to a greater focus 
on the dynamic management of risk portfolios. 
This in turn led to an increasing share of trading 
and tradable assets, including the strong growth of 
hedging instruments. Historical cost accounting 
proved inadequate for these developments. 
Fair  value accounting has, by now, become the 
norm for assets held for trading or available for 
sale. In fact, for Deutsche Bank, at year-end 2007, 
76% of assets and 51% of the liabilities on our 
consolidated balance sheet were carried at fair value. 
Furthermore, modern risk management and fair 
value accounting go hand-in-hand, as risk hedges 
would not be feasible without fair value accounting. 
Similarly, without fair value accounting, it would not 
be possible to calculate value-at-risk (VaR) as well as 
economic and regulatory capital for market risk.
This importance of valuations for risk management 
tools demonstrates the wider beneﬁ  ts of fair value 
accounting. It acts as an early warning system, where 
losses show up in banks’ proﬁ  t and loss accounts, 
before they materialise in the real economy.
It provides a clearer picture on the positions and 
risks and increases the transparency for investors 
and counterparties. Thus, mark-to-market imposes 
stricter discipline on banks’ risk management and 
improves market discipline. Conversely, in the case 
with historical cost accounting, banks must own up 
to the full consequences of past investment decisions 
and, if need be, are forced to take remedial action. 
Fair value accounting is therefore not neutral, but 
has a direct, beneﬁ  cial impact on banks’ actions.
Against this background, we need to address a 
fundamental question that, in my view, has not 
yet been given sufﬁ  cient attention: given the fact 
that ever larger parts of banks’ balance sheets 
have become more  tradable and given that the
originate-and-distribute model will survive this 
crisis, how can we deﬁ  ne an accounting regime that is 
suitable, consistent and meaningful for tradable and 
non-tradable assets? Or, to focus on the crucial 
question: how can we deﬁ  ne accounting rules for the 
borderline between these two categories? There is 
widespread consensus that fair value accounting is 
the best accounting rule for all tradable assets. At the 
same time, not every asset a bank holds is liquid and 
many probably never will be (or, possibly, should be 
in the interest of ﬁ  nancial stability) and for those 
assets traditional accrual accounting will continue 
to be the right regime. The difﬁ  cult case, however, 
is the borderline area between these two categories 
represented by assets that may fall into either category 
and where a bank may choose to shift assets between 
held-to-maturity and the trading book depending,
for example, on market circumstances and the
bank’s risk appetite. For these cases, consistent 
accounting rules need to be deﬁ  ned for moving 
assets between the banking and the trading book. It 
goes without saying that corresponding regulatory 
requirements relating to capital and liquidity would ARTICLES
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also need to be deﬁ  ned in a way that simultaneously 
paid due regard to ﬁ  nancial stability and did not 
restrict banks’ ability to alter their risk-return proﬁ  le 
unduly.
To some extent, this issue is already on the table 
of the accounting boards (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board –FASB and International Accounting 
Standards Board –IASB), as the crisis has revealed a 
need to align the respective rules in the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and US Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) accounting 
frameworks on shifting assets between accounting 
categories. But like the procyclicality of fair value, 
this issue needs to be seen not just as an accounting 
issue, but as a ﬁ  nancial stability issue as well.
It is thus essential for central banks which are the 
protectors of ﬁ  nancial stability, to become involved. 
The debate is complicated by a third issue that comes 
into play: banks use internal models and proprietary 
data to value structured credit products. If these 
products were to have a future, this needs to change. 
Valuation models have to follow generally accepted 
accounting rules and the underlying price data has 
to become available to all market participants. It is 
not by accident that equity derivatives, which are 
easily as complex as structured credit products, 
have been much less affected by this crisis. The 
rules to calculate indexes are well-known and the 
equity market enjoys a sophisticated infrastructure 
to provide underlying price information.
RISK MANAGEMENT: 
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH NEEDED
It would, of course, be inappropriate to suggest that 
the weakness of the US mortgage market, and the 
shortcomings of structured products or fair value, were 
the only deﬁ  ciencies leading to the current crisis. In 
truth, in many banks, advances in risk management 
had not kept pace with ﬁ  nancial innovation. Moreover, 
many banks had concentrated their efforts on 
implementing Basel II. The Basel framework, however, 
focuses on assets held in the banking book. In contrast, 
the current crisis concerns assets that were often 
held in the trading book or even in off-balance sheet 
structures. When prices dropped precipitously or the 
market liquidity for the assets suddenly evaporated, 
banks were forced to hold on to –and to fund– assets 
that were expected to be sold on to other investors.
In fact, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between 
two groups of banks: the ﬁ  rst group, which includes 
Deutsche Bank, is represented by banks that applied 
the “originate-and-distribute” model properly.
Proper application means that a bank ensures that:
￿ there is due diligence of underlying credit quality;
￿ its structured credit portfolio is a function of client 
demand;
￿ that junior and ﬁ  rst-loss exposures are fully and 
effectively hedged or sold.
At Deutsche Bank, the average pre-crisis 
turnover time for structured credit products was 
60-90 days. This stands in contrast to the second 
group of banks that instead, took the risk 
back on through the back-door by investing in 
these assets or by providing back-up lines for 
off-balance sheet vehicles (SIVs, conduits) that 
invested in these assets.
The difference between the two groups can be seen 
clearly by the size of the losses that they suffered. The 
former group got caught by the unexpected freezing 
of the markets and thus experienced warehouse risk 
–but the losses were thereby limited to the amount 
of ﬂ  ow business in any given period of time and to 
the price declines experienced between origination 
and resale. In contrast, the latter group was exposed 
with the full nominal value of their exposure.
It also turned out that the latter group of banks 
often suffered  from  signiﬁ  cant  deﬁ  ciencies  in 
corporate governance. Common themes included 
observations that risk management was not 
sufﬁ  ciently independent, IT systems were incomplete 
and could not aggregate risks on a group-wide 
basis, and top management failed to effectively
communicate the bank’s risk appetite to the 
entire institution. Similarly, too many institutions
had “outsourced” parts of their risk management, 
i.e. relied excessively on the judgement of rating agencies 
rather than performing their own due diligence.
Albeit to varying degrees, both groups suffered from 
deﬁ  ciencies in their risk models and their stress 
testing. Most banks assumed that hedges would work 
even under stressed circumstances. Increasingly 
however, indices became traded in their own right ARTICLES
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(as they retained their liquidity) and de-linked from 
the underlying assets. Having seen the wild gyration 
of the ABX indexes, which were often used to hedge 
exposure to residential mortgages, it became quite 
clear that there is a signiﬁ  cant basis risk between the 
index and the underlying mortgages.
There were also deﬁ  ciencies in current liquidity 
management. Here, too, the scenarios employed 
for stress tests were not extreme enough, which 
resulted in an underestimation of the amount of 
liquidity needed and an overestimation of the 
degree of liquidity of assets held for this purpose. In 
several institutions, the internal pricing of liquidity 
was not strict enough and potential demand on 
liquid funds therefore not priced in sufﬁ  ciently 
when risk positions were taken; often this was 
the result of liquidity risk management not being 
integrated adequately into overall risk management. 
Again, banks such as Deutsche Bank, where the 
management of credit, market, operational and 
funding/liquidity risk was fully integrated already 
well before the crisis unfolded, have reaped the 
beneﬁ  ts of these efforts.
With so many deﬁ  ciencies, a big mea culpa from the 
ﬁ  nancial industry is therefore necessary. However, as 
in any crisis, there were developments which would 
have been extremely difﬁ  cult to foresee. Prior to the 
crisis, there were no indications that assets classes 
such as leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) and residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) or RMBS and 
commercial mortgage-backed securities  (CMBSs) 
were strongly correlated based on the respective 
fundamental drivers for these asset classes. However, 
correlations between these (and other) asset classes 
did increase strongly as the crisis struck simply due 
to the fact that these assets were held by the same 
ABCP-ﬁ  nanced vehicles. As markets seized, SIVs 
and conduits were unable to roll-over their funding 
and the assets rapidly lost in value as ﬁ  re sales 
became necessary to raise liquidity. These  factors 
led to simultaneous declines in the prices of assets 
that are fundamentally uncorrelated. Speciﬁ  cally, 
leveraged loan commitments, held for resale in 
the secondary markets, fell dramatically in value, 
despite being entirely uncorrelated with US housing 
markets. These loan products are essentially illiquid 
with price discovery normally occurring during 
syndication and being based on related market 
prices and cash ﬂ  ow analysis of relevant parameters. 
However, with markets disappearing, originators 
as well as investors had no guide-posts to draw upon 
and some prices fell well below those implied by 
models and fundamentals.
There is a broader message to be heeded here: more 
research needs to be carried out on liquidity risk in 
a market-based ﬁ  nancial system. There is still a gap 
in our understanding of market dynamics in times of 
market illiquidity. While this is understandable, prior 
to this crisis, it seemed beyond reasonable credibility 
that liquidity could ever evaporate across almost all 
market segments. But this is nonetheless a serious 
omission. All existing risk models, all pricing models 
are essentially based on the implicit assumption that 
meaningful price signals are available on a continuous 
basis. Should it turn out that this assumption can
no longer be sustained in the modern ﬁ  nancial 
system, an entirely new approach to modelling 
correlations, market dynamics and stress scenarios 
would be needed.
REMEDIES: THE BLUEPRINTS ARE AVAILABLE 
–AND LOOK SIMILAR
Restoring conﬁ  dence in ﬁ  nancial markets will require 
a concerted, targeted and all-encompassing effort –but 
this will not happen by itself. The ﬁ  nancial crisis has 
caused a widespread loss of trust in the ﬁ  nancial system. 
Banks do not only have to rebuild their capital and 
strategies, but also the trust of investors, counterparties 
and depositors. True, ﬁ   nancial institutions, as a 
matter of principle, do not favour ever-increasing
regulation; yet, the business of ﬁ  nancial institutions 
vitally depends on the preservation of ﬁ  nancial 
stability and the general public’s trust of the ﬁ  nancial 
system. Given that regulation is necessary to sustain 
(or rebuild) capital  and trust, banks would be
well-advised to help frame these rules.
The loss of trust is especially pronounced in the 
markets for structured credit products. Many observers 
predict that the crisis will lead to a permanent 
demise of complex ﬁ  nancial instruments, especially 
structured credit products, which many claim to lie 
at the heart of the crisis. However, just as the 1929-32 
US stock market crash did not lead to the extinction 
of shares as an asset class and just as the emerging 
market crisis of the late 1990s did not lead to the 
permanent disappearance of emerging market asset, 
structured credit products will survive this ﬁ  nancial 
crisis albeit probably in modiﬁ  ed form.ARTICLES
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At Deutsche Bank, we have, over the years, already 
developed the components necessary to successfully 
operate the originate-and-distribute model and to 
withstand even difﬁ  cult market environments, such as 
the current one. In my view, these components are:
￿ integrated and independent risk management;
￿ full use of risk transfer, and robust underwriting 
and risk monitoring standards;
￿ comprehensive stress testing that complements 
traditional risk measures (value-at-risk –VaR, 
economic capital);
￿ effective and consolidated management of capital, 
funding and liquidity.
Contrary to what is occasionally argued these 
days, structured credit products are not inherently 
problematic. But these products are not sufﬁ  ciently 
transparent and market infrastructure has not 
developed in line with the rapid growth of these 
markets. Collective action by market participants 
has failed to address these issues in time. If the 
ﬁ   nancial industry does  not manage to rectify 
matters quickly, now, we should not be surprised to 
see the public sector intervene. This would probably 
result in tighter regulation and fewer market-based 
structures but banks will have no one to blame 
but themselves.
Investors will only return to the markets for 
structured credit products when conﬁ  dence returns. 
In a way, the situation is comparable to the events of 
the Great Depression, when a lack of transparency 
on company accounts aggravated the Dow’s fall. 
It was only after the establishment of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934, which 
set mandatory standards for the disclosure of 
listed company’s accounts, that conﬁ  dence could 
be restored, as investors were then able to assess 
the quality of companies’ assets and evaluate share 
prices accordingly.
Similarly, today, market participants, with the help of 
the public sector, will need to establish mechanisms 
and ways to restore conﬁ   dence in the markets, 
especially those for complex structured credit products. 
First, there is a need to build an infrastructure that 
reduces settlement risk by means of automation and 
netting. Standardisation will also play a role. Second, 
there is a need to increase transparency by pooling 
data on transaction volumes and prices. Originators 
need to disclose sufﬁ  cient data on the underlying 
assets so as to enable investors to perform their 
own due diligence rather than to passively rely on 
third-party assessments, such as those of rating 
agencies. Current experience in those markets shows 
that transparency indeed makes the difference: while 
many banks ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult to place such products 
with investors, some succeed in doing so, because 
they provide comprehensive and credible information 
on the performance characteristics of these products 
and on the risks in the underlying portfolios. This 
allows investors to make their own analysis and 
make an informed investment decision.
As discussed above, though, the deﬁ  ciencies 
revealed by the crisis are not limited to the area of 
structured credit products. Rather, a whole range 
of issues needs to be addressed by the private and 
the public sector. Fortunately, neither the ﬁ  nancial 
industry nor public authorities are starting from 
scratch here. Indeed, many of the required reforms 
had already been set in train before the crisis struck 
as the following examples illustrate.
￿  The international banking community had 
already worked intensively on the issue of liquidity 
management well before the crisis struck. Already 
in spring 2006, the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF) had published principles for better 
liquidity management; and there is consensus 
that banks that had already implemented these 
recommendations have fared better than those
that did not.
￿ Similarly, governance for risk management is a 
major, –though still underestimated– part of the 
Basel II accord, namely in the shape of the Internal 
Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP). This 
underlines the commonly-held view that, had Basel II 
already have been implemented in 2006, the fall-out 
from the crisis would have been less severe.
￿ In an initiative prompted and coordinated by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, major investment 
banks have worked jointly on reducing backlogs in 
the conﬁ  rmation of trades in credit derivatives and 
on the greater automation of trade conﬁ  rmations.
￿ In the European Union, ﬁ  nancial supervisors had 
already taken ﬁ  rst steps towards a more systematic ARTICLES
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approach in the supervision of large and complex 
cross-border ﬁ  nancial institutions.
Against this background, it is hardly surprising, but 
nonetheless augurs well that the three major, recently 
released reports, which list recommendations on 
how to enhance the functioning and resilience 
of ﬁ   nancial markets, share a lot of common 
ground. Thus, the IIF’s Committee on market best 
practices, the Counterparty Risk Management 
Group (“Corrigan III report”) and the G7’s Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF) all put governance and the 
processes for risk management at the heart of 
their recommendations. It is also remarkable and 
a testament to improved international cooperation, 
as well as an alignment of philosophies, that all 
three reports put emphasis on principles-based 
regulation, on international coordination, on close
relations between the private and the public sector 
and display a preference for self-regulation over 
prescriptive measures.
As regards risk management, all three reports 
emphasise that ﬁ  nancial institutions need to develop a 
risk culture that is commensurate with their business 
model and that is effectively transmitted from 
top-management to the entire organisation. There is 
also a large overlap in their recommendations in terms 
of the improvement of stress testing, better liquidity 
management, the management of off-balance sheet 
exposures, and the integration of quantitative and 
qualitative risk measures. Moreover, the reports 
are united in the belief that a comprehensive 
approach to risk management also needs to address 
product development and new product approval 
with a view to a life-cycle approach in assessing 
the risks inherent in complex ﬁ  nancial products. 
Finally, all three reports touch upon the issue of 
compensation noting that there is a need to formulate 
principles that align compensation structures with 
long-term proﬁ  tability and the risk appetite deﬁ  ned 
for the institution.
Moving beyond risk management sensu strictu, 
all three reports share the view that the 
above-mentioned problem of deﬁ  ning appropriate 
rules for the valuation of illiquid assets requires 
urgent attention. They are united in stressing the 
need for and the virtues of greater transparency, 
especially the detailed disclosure of exposures and 
the provision of more information on complex 
ﬁ  nancial transactions. Again, our own experience 
shows that this can provide tangible, monetary 
beneﬁ  ts: our loan exposure management unit was 
able to place structured credit transactions, including 
ﬁ   rst loss exposures, even in difﬁ  cult  market 
conditions. Due to the high level of transparency we 
provide on the pricing mechanism and underlying 
performance, investors never lost their conﬁ  dence 
in the collaterised loan obligations (CLOs)
that securitise Deutsche Bank’s German mid 
cap exposure.
Given the differences in their composition, mandate 
and background, it is not surprising that there are 
also areas where the focus of reports deviates. 
Thus, for example, the “Corrigan III”-report 
devotes a substantial part of its recommendations 
to the infrastructure for over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives trading, focusing on the creation of a 
central counterparty (CCP) and the establishment 
of technologies to conﬁ  rm and settle trades and 
determine exposures rapidly. In turn, only the IIF 
and the FSF reports give recommendations on rating 
agencies urging them to address potential conﬂ  icts 
of interest, to improve the ratings process and to 
increase transparency on rating methodologies.
Finally, given the prominent role that liquidity 
issues have played in the crisis, it hardly comes as 
a surprise that the role of central banks receives 
prominent coverage in the reports. In an effort to 
calm markets and prevent a spillover of ﬁ  nancial 
market turmoil into the real economy, central 
banks injected substantial amounts of liquidity into 
the ﬁ  nancial system. The professional and timely 
action by central banks certainly had a calming 
effect on ﬁ  nancial markets. However, reﬂ  ecting the 
global nature of the crisis, there is a well-justiﬁ  ed 
call for closer international coordination as well 
as an alignment of central banks’ instruments and 
policies for the provision of emergency liquidity. 
The question is also being raised as to what is 
the appropriate role of central banks in ﬁ  nancial 
supervision, duly recognising the potential for 
creating moral hazard issues. On a related issue, the 
recent crisis period has also rekindled the debate 
on whether central banks should take into account 
asset price bubbles more proactively when setting 
monetary policy. True, it is difﬁ  cult to say with ARTICLES
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Financial markets are at the heart of modern economies and there can be no doubt that the ﬁ  nancial 
innovations seen over the last two decades have contributed positively to increasing the underlying growth 
rate of the global economy. In particular, the greater tradability of ﬁ  nancial assets and ﬁ  nancial risk has 
increased the amount of capital available as well as the efﬁ  ciency of capital allocation. However, as the 
current ﬁ  nancial crisis has painfully made clear, such a market-based ﬁ  nancial system is less tolerant to 
weaknesses and mistakes; it therefore requires a sound ﬁ  nancial infrastructure and highest standards for 
risk management both in ﬁ  nancial institutions and in the work of ﬁ  nancial supervisors and central banks.
Above all, this will require:
• an accounting regime that gives reliable, meaningful and consistent signals to all market participants 
and supervisors; 
• adequate recognition for the central role liquidity plays in a market-based ﬁ  nancial system and corresponding 
tools in the hands of ﬁ  nancial institutions and central banks for dealing with liquidity risk;
• a ﬁ  nancial market infrastructure that inspires conﬁ  dence through full transparency on products and prices.
In addition, macroeconomic policy, especially monetary policy, must pay more attention to ﬁ  nancial stability 
issues, naturally with a global perspective. A tall order? No doubt– but the blueprints for this are on the 
table; it will be up to the ﬁ  nancial industry and the public sector to jointly take the right decisions.
any certainty whether instances of unusual price 
dynamics constitute a bubble and undoubtedly, 
central banks will be blamed if they try to prick such 
bubbles. Yet, considering the economic dislocation 
that is caused by the bursting of the bubbles –such 
as we are witnessing today– there is, in my view, a 
strong case for central banks to act pre-emptively to 
stave off greater damage in the future.